Flynn chides DHS for foot dragging on box scans

Flynn chides DHS for foot dragging on box scans    The acquiescence of Congress towards Homeland Secretary Janet Napolitano's recent decision to invoke a two-year waiver of the mid-2012 deadline for scanning all inbound ocean containers is not a sign that lawmakers are satisfied with existing marine cargo security programs, national security analyst Stephen Flynn said.
   Members of Congress are still concerned that the selective inspection approach based on risk analysis of each container is flawed, but realize their mandate to implement 100 percent scanning at overseas ports within 30 months is unworkable due to the lack of effective equipment and other challenges, according to Flynn.
   The Department of Homeland Security and others have warned that technical, political, legal, logistical and financial difficulties make deployment of imaging and radiation detection equipment at hundreds of ports impossible without significant cargo delays at ports. Legislators did not object when Napolitano declared her intention to extend the deadline.

Related News •   •   SFI put on backburner

   Congress passed the mandatory inspection law in 2007 in response to criticism that the Container Security Initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, Automated Targeting System and other risk-based programs are not rigorous enough to filter out potential smuggling threats by terrorists. The Government Accountability Office, DHS Inspector General and others have documented problems such as limited resources to verify the trustworthiness of shippers, minimal levels of inspections by partner customs authorities in foreign ports and low quality of shipping data.
   DHS officials counter that the introduction of the new '10+2' rule under which importers are required to file detailed shipping information prior to departure has already enhanced their ability to distinguish between high and low-risk shipments.

Napolitano

   The reluctance of DHS, especially Customs and Border Protection, to gradually build extra shipment scrutiny on top of existing programs could come back to haunt the trade industry in the event of a terrorist attack because political pressure will then require a hasty implementation of 100 percent scanning that doesn't incorporate thoughtful design criteria for each port to prevent backlogs, Flynn warned.
   The DHS had intended to expand its Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program to an additional port in 2009 and nine new locations in fiscal year 2010, according to the budget it submitted to Congress last February. Although the department opposed 100 percent inspections, it claimed that imaging all containers embarking from a few high-risk locations was worthwhile. SFI trials of integrated scanning and radiation detection have been conducted at five ports for a limited time or on a limited basis during the past two years. One port has since withdrawn from the program, another has yet to begin scanning operations and a third is continuing without any further cooperation from local customs authorities. The program was intended to test whether U.S. officials could scan all cargo on a small scale, and apply any lessons to other ports, but non-intrusive inspections of U.S.-bound containers fell well short of the goal at the low-volume sites.

Ahern

   Then-acting CBP Commissioner Jayson Ahern recently admitted, when questioned on the subject a month ago, that DHS no longer has immediate plans to expand SFI because of ongoing technical challenges, costs and disinterest by foreign governments. (SFI Director Richard DiNucci on Wednesday insisted his office is still working with the government of Pakistan to bring the program to the Port of Karachi, in addition to the existing operation at Port Qasim.)

DiNucci

   'If we're not willing to think about how to mature beyond what we have, it sets up for my nightmare scenario if something does happen at some point. Then, the deadline becomes a hard deadline for 100 percent. Our capability to meet it is obviously not there and we end up basically with the cure worse than the disease,' Flynn said in an interview following a Dec. 14 roundtable discussion about the global recession at the Center for National Policy.
   Flynn, who became the think tank's new president in January, has long articulated that the United States will do more damage to itself through its response to a terrorist attack involving cross-border transportation because government officials, lacking the tools to tell if there are more threats in the system, will feel compelled to shut down travel and trade until every conveyance is checked for weapons or tampering.
   Congress is going along with punting the scan-all requirement down the road two years, but the consequence of not building a bridge between the current layered security strategy and more imaging will be pressure to go to a 100 percent inspection regime right away if a terrorist attack exploits the global supply chain, he added.
   'Shame on Washington and shame on the trade if a year from now we are where we are. It's not that we'll have 100 percent security. There's no such thing. But it is that the risk management tools have to be seen as constantly evolving,' he said.
   Flynn argues that DHS is creating a false choice between a government-run scanning system that will cripple trade and the existing risk management tools that industry has accepted as workable. He says the only way for imaging to work is to make it a universal system for containers heading to any country and to let the private sector manage the process.
   A group of terminal operators has already offered to host the equipment for governments in exchange for the ability to charge shippers a fee for verifying the contents of each box. They've touted business models that would allow governments to do the image analysis or have third-party services check for anomalies with government oversight. CBP officials have not accepted the offer because they oppose comprehensive inspections and feel that the private sector should not be trusted to do what they consider an inherently governmental job.
   Flynn pointed out that the reluctance to partner with industry on inspections stands in contrast to the Transportation Security Administration's Certified Cargo Screening Program in which approved shippers and logistics providers are encouraged to pre-screen cargo themselves so that it doesn't have to be unpacked and checked for explosives at the airport by airlines — not government inspectors.
   CBP's position 'doesn't make sense when you compare air cargo (security) which has been built around essentially a private industry approach for third-party players. Is air cargo less risky than maritime cargo?' he said.
   Flynn told AmericanShipper.com that the Washington-based Center for National Policy will afford him more resources than his fellowship at the Council on Foreign Relations to push his twin causes of building a resilient, grassroots homeland security apparatus and reversing the nation's neglect of infrastructure investment. The small think tank will focus on those topics and the concept that infrastructure is part of national security rather than conduct research on all types of public policy. Flynn said he planned to harness expertise from the energy sector in Houston, the Internet infrastructure of Silicon Valley and the financial world in New York to lay out a road map for infrastructure policy and financing.                     
   For detailed analysis about developments with 100 percent scanning, see 'False positive' American Shipper's January cover story, and bonus Web coverage about Flynn's private sector approach and international opposition to U.S. policy. ' Eric Kulisch