Easy does it: Buying, exporting U.S. military technology
A congressional watchdog agency demonstrated how easy it may be for terrorist groups and unfriendly nations to buy U.S.-made military technology domestically and illegally ship it overseas.
In 2008 and early 2009, the Government Accountability Office at the behest of the House Energy and Commerce's oversight and investigations subcommittee began investigating controls on the export of military and 'dual-use' technology, or commercial goods with potential military applications. The investigation involved an undercover test to determine how vulnerable the United States is to covert acquisition and export of sensitive technology.
'The results are troubling,' said Rep. Bart Stupak, chairman of the subcommittee, during a hearing on Thursday.
The GAO set up a fictitious company, led by a fictitious person, to acquire 12 different military and dual-use items that are subject to export control laws. The agency was able to acquire several components used in nuclear weapons programs, including a trigger spark gap, accelerometer, and gyrochip. The agency also successfully acquired several pieces of military equipment, including a night vision scope, body armor, and an F-16 engine-monitoring system computer.
Of the 12 companies approached by the GAO all of them agreed to sell these sensitive items to the fictitious company. The companies made no effort to question the buyer and conducted the transactions entirely by e-mail and credit card payments. The night vision maker even signed up the GAO's fake company as an authorized distributor of its product.
'We found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the United States,' the GAO said in its report. 'Items we obtained were not only sensitive in nature, but were also in demand by foreign governments and terrorist organizations.'
The GAO noted that seven of the items it obtained during the investigation have been the center of criminal indictments and convictions for violations of export control laws. With the exception of the F-16 engine computer, all the items were purchased brand new by the GAO investigators.
The Department of Justice reported in 2008 that more than 145 defendants faced criminal charges for violations of export-control laws, and about 43 percent of the defendants charged in these cases were attempting to illegally transfer items to Iran and China.
'The only thing more surprising than the ease with which GAO acquired this sensitive equipment is the fact that it was apparently entirely legal,' Stupak said. 'When questioned afterwards, the companies involved explained that they are not required by current law to apply for an export license when selling specified military or dual use products directly to domestic purchasers. There is no requirement for them to conduct any background checks or due diligence on the buyers, much less submit the proposed sale to the government for a license to purchase.'
The GAO also used its fictitious company to successfully export dummy copies of the technology it purchased by Federal Express to a country known as a transshipment point for military and nuclear technology. Authorities in the country were instructed to intercept the shipments upon arrival.
'A comprehensive network of controls and enforcement is necessary to ensure sensitive technology does not make it into the hands of unauthorized individuals,' the GAO told House lawmakers. 'However, the lack of legal restrictions over domestic sales of these items, combined with the difficulties associated with inspecting packages and individuals leaving the United States, results in weak control environment that does not effectively prevent terrorists and agents of foreign governments from obtaining these sensitive items.'
Easy does it: Buying, exporting U.S. military technology
