GAO report attacks TSA air cargo security efforts

GAO report attacks TSA air cargo security efforts    A government report released Monday blasts efforts by U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies to secure air cargo headed into the United States as underdeveloped, lacking intra-agency communication and not taking advantage of security efforts by both industry and foreign governments.
   Compiled by the Government Accounting Office at the request of congressional members, the nearly 100-page report ultimately concluded that air cargo security efforts by DHS's Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Protection are still 'in early stages and could be strengthened.'
   The TSA, formed in the months after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, is charged with providing for the screening of all passengers and property, including cargo, U.S. mail, and carryon and checked baggage transported onboard passenger aircraft. It is also mandated to put into place, as soon as practicable, a system to screen, inspect or otherwise ensure the security of cargo imported or exported onboard all-cargo aircraft.
   The GAO investigation found that in little more than five years the TSA completed a risk-based strategic plan to address domestic air cargo security, but did not develop a similar strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security. This including failing to including how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders.
   In addition, while the GAO found that the TSA has identified the primary threats to inbound air cargo, it has not yet assessed inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets.
   The TSA's March 2007 air cargo security rule incorporated a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of inbound air cargo. In implementing this final rule the TSA amended its security directives and programs to triple the percentage of cargo inspected on domestic and foreign passenger aircraft.
   Despite this positive note, the GAO found that the TSA continues to exempt certain types of inbound air cargo transported on passenger air carriers from inspection.
   Further, TSA inspects domestic and foreign passenger air carriers with service to the United States to assess whether they are complying with air cargo security requirements, but does not conduct compliance inspections of all air carriers transporting inbound air cargo.
   The GAO also expressed concerns that the TSA has not developed performance goals and measures to determine to what extent air carriers are complying with security requirements.
   And, despite CBP's recent moves to target inbound air cargo transported on passenger and all-cargo aircraft that may pose a security risk and inspecting such cargo once it arrives in the United States, the TSA and CBP do not have a systematic process in place to share information.
   The report recommends that DHS develop a risk-based inbound air cargo security strategy; develop a systematic process to improve interagency communication; and analyze air cargo security practices used by air cargo industry stakeholders and foreign governments to determine their applicability to the United States.
   The report points out that while DHS generally concurred with the report's findings, the GAO has concerns that DHS's plans may not fully address the recommendations.
   In compiling the report the GAO examined what actions DHS has taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all, these efforts could be strengthened. It also looked at what practices the air cargo industry and foreign governments have adopted that could enhance DHS's efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and to what extent DHS has worked with foreign governments to enhance their air cargo security efforts.
   GAO officials reviewed relevant DHS documents, interviewed DHS officials, and conducted site visits to seven countries in Europe and Asia.