APL warns against large-scale U.S. physical container inspections

APL warns against large-scale U.S. physical container inspections    Physically inspecting 10 percent of America’s 9 million inbound cargo containers would be costly, harmful to international supply chains and would not substantially increase maritime security, a senior executive of APL has warned.
   “Even a 10-percent physical exam rate, as suggested by some lawmakers, would be extremely expensive and would cause unacceptable delays to the international supply chain,” Earl Agron, vice president of security at APL, told the business advisory committee of the transportation center at Northwestern University Wednesday. “That’s why we support the current system, which provides security with less expense and delay.”
   APL estimates that inspecting roughly 900,000 containers a year would require 6,000 to 7,000 more customs officers than the approximately 19,000 employed today.
   Agron said about 5 to 6 percent of inbound containers receive non-intrusive, external inspections by sensing equipment. Of those, “only a few” are opened and searched by customs officers, he said.
   However, shipping information for 100 percent of inbound cargo containers is reviewed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection before the boxes are permitted onboard U.S.-bound ships — a policy that CBP has recently reaffirmed after the Bush administration was accused by political opponents of not doing enough on maritime security.
   “Sophisticated software targets specific containers for additional action, including inspections at the port of entry or even refusing to allow a box onboard,” APL said.
   Agron praised CBP's targeting approach. “What’s important is which boxes you inspect,” he said. “That’s what the customs system is designed to do — identify the containers that should receive more attention. We think that makes more sense than simply saying we should inspect a certain number of containers.”
   Agron also emphasized the importance of public- and private-sector collaboration in planning to re-start U.S. ports in the event of a catastrophic terrorist act at a seaport. It is generally assumed all U.S. ports would be shut down following such an event, just as all airports were closed following the Sept. 11 attacks.
   “Would cargo coming from foreign ports covered by the government’s Container Security Initiative (CSI) be allowed in first?”    Agron asked. “Would carriers and shippers who are part of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) be given priority?”
   He also asked who would be in charge of these decisions — the Coast Guard, CBP, the FBI, or possibly state and local authorities?
   “It’s important that everyone involved understand the expectations — shippers, carriers, our trading partners and U.S. authorities,” Agron said. “Otherwise, we risk prolonging a shutdown and magnifying the economic ripple effects of a terrorist act.”