Busan response timely despite communications glitches

Busan response timely despite communications glitches A U.S. Coast Guard-commissioned panel has found that the initial clean-up response to the COSCO Busan oil spill in San Francisco Bay last November was nearly 10 times greater than required by state and federal law, despite heavy fog and communication problems immediately after the spill.
   Despite this, the panel found more than 100 areas regarding response and preparedness that could be improved, including key findings that communications and language problems exacerbated the clean-up problems.
   Issued Monday, the 120-page report did not seek to identify the cause of the container vessel's collision with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge on Nov. 7, but instead focused solely on the first two weeks of the clean-up response to the resulting spill of nearly 54,000 gallons, or 1,275 barrels, of diesel bunker fuel into the bay. The entire spill, which the report found occurred within 'seconds or minutes' of the collision, eventually fouled dozens of Bay Area beaches, led to the postponement of the area crab fishing season, and killed thousands of birds and other wildlife.
   The initial response, according to the report, comprised 168 responders and 25 vessels within the first day after the spill, increasing to nearly 1,400 responders and 41 clean-up vessels involved on the seventh day of the clean-up effort. The report noted that while state and federal law require about 7,000 barrels of material recovery capacity to be on scene within six hours of a spill, the actual capacity of the equipment on hand within six hours of the incident was nearly 58,000 barrels. This increased to more than 75,000 barrels of recovery capacity within the first 24 hours following the Busan collision.
   The 'Phase One' report was created by a 12-member Coast Guard-formed Incident Specific Preparedness Review team panel that included representatives from the local, state and federal government, industry, and environmental interests. The panel, chaired by retired Coast Guard Rear Adm. Carlton Moore, a former administrator of California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response, countered many early criticisms of the Coast Guard regarding the clean-up response.
   The report found that, contrary to media and local government reports at the time of the incident, communication and coordination between the Coast Guard unified command and specific local agencies, such as the City of San Francisco Department of Public Health, were effective and quick. However, the panel noted that it took several days for the unified command's local government liaison to establish a smooth process for coordinating with local agencies.
   In developing the 138 recommendations regarding spill preparedness and response capabilities, the panel identified key response problems immediately following the incident that included:
   ' The Coast Guard officer trained to determine oil spill magnitude in the Bay Area was out of town and junior officers were under-trained in this skill, leading to a gross underestimate of the size of the Busan spill. This was compounded by a staff failure to communicate the true size of the spill to the incident command until more than seven hours after the initial incident.
   ' A state Office of Spill Prevention and Response official who could have accurately estimated the spill size was delayed getting to the incident size due to the agency's lack of an available vessel.
   ' The local Coast Guard vessel traffic system did not communicate vital spill location information to the oil spill command center, delaying responders from finding the spill.
   ' Language problems kept Coast Guard officials from properly interviewing the Chinese chief engineer and led to an initial estimation of the spill size at only 146 gallons.
   ' Heavy fog restricted the use of aircraft to locate and detail the spread of the spill.
   ' Private clean-up firms hired by the owner of the Busan responded quickly with absorbent booms but may have been hampered by aggressive policing of costs by auditors from the Busan’s insurance carrier.
   California congressional representatives used the release of the report to heap new criticism on the Coast Guard response to the incident.
   House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from San Francisco, called the Coast Guard's initial failure at assessing the size of the spill as 'unacceptable.' The report, she said, only highlights that the Coast Guard can do better.
   Sen. Dianne Feinstein, also a Bay Area Democrat and a vocal critic of the Coast Guard response, called the report 'disappointing,' and said she would introduce legislation boosting spill-response preparedness and oversight. The legislation, according to Feinstein, would also require that cargo ships be double-hulled if they carry more than 150,000 gallons of diesel fuel.
   While hopeful that the report could help everyone involved learn from the mistakes of the Busan incident, Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., said the report confirms what she suspected from the start: 'Namely that a language barrier and communications problems, lack of coordination and inexperienced personnel contributed to failures in the response.'
   A second report by the panel, covering the clean-up efforts from the second week to the end of operations, is expected from the panel within several months. ' Keith Higginbotham