COAC: Remove scan-all ‘splinter?

COAC: Remove scan-all æsplinterÆ    The U.S. government should repeal the law that requires all ocean containers to be scanned for terrorist threats in overseas ports and should limit the release of security-sensitive manifest data to the public, according to recommendations submitted Thursday to the Department of Homeland Security by a federal advisory panel.
   The report is intended to help DHS and the White House develop a national strategy for global supply chain security, due out sometime this fall. DHS is required under the 2006 Safe Port Act to provide an updated version of its international maritime supply chain security strategy, but the Obama administration has expanded the process to include all modes of cargo transportation and input from multiple executive branch agencies.
   The Commercial Operations Advisory Committee, comprising 20 industry representatives, said the 9/11 Act requirement to scan all inbound containers should be reversed because of the political and operational hurdles it presents in foreign ports and to the free flow of commerce. Similarly, it said the law requiring 100 percent of cargo on passenger airlines to be screened should be changed and inspections in both modes based on risk assessments of individual shipments.
   Scan-all mandates are 'akin to a perpetual splinter in our finger,' said Earl Agron, vice president of security at ocean carrier APL and chairman of COAC's supply chain security subcommittee, on a conference call meeting with DHS.
   The panel also expressed concern that publicly available ocean manifest data transmitted to U.S. Customs creates security vulnerabilities and undermines the effectiveness of some Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism minimum-security criteria. The manifest data available within 24 hours includes data elements such as the vessel name, route, port of unlading, estimated arrival date, bill of lading number, foreign port of lading, description of goods, container number and seal number.
   The information creates vulnerabilities because an unscrupulous trucker could use the information to pick up someone else's load simply by providing the container and B/L numbers because that is all the information some terminals require for a driver to take delivery of a container, COAC said. Publishing the number of a high-security seal negates the use of such devices by participants in the voluntary C-TPAT program. The group recommended the law be changed to protect these types of information from public disclosure.
   Other recommendations included in the report are:
   ' Focus more attention on air and surface transportation security.
   ' Timely sharing of actionable intelligence among government agencies and the private sector should be a strategic priority.
   ' Increase the number of large and small-scale security exercises to improve and measure resiliency. Preparation is necessary to prevent the types of confusion evident in the government response to Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico. Not all exercises need to be large and expensive. 'Resilience is dependent on collaborative relationships. The best way to learn how to engage with these parties is to practice with them,' Agron said.
   ' Coordinate supply chain security protocols inside and outside of DHS should be a priority.
   ' Electronic seals and container security devices can be easily bypassed by criminals and should not be considered as part of any security regime. 'Rushing unproven technology into the supply chain will undermine progress made to date, provide a false sense of security and will make the supply chain less secure ' Unfortunately, available and emerging supply chain technology often requires a high degree of human intervention, potentially causing bottlenecks, false positives and delays in the supply chain without a commensurate improvement in security.' ' Eric Kulisch