DHS turns attention to small vessel threat

DHS turns attention to small vessel threat The U.S. Department of Homeland Security unveiled a strategy Monday to deal with the threat of terrorists using small boats to launch attacks on U.S. infrastructure.
   DHS said it is considering lowering the size threshold of vessels required to provide advance notice of international arrival, and using tracking devices on fishing vessels and other small commercial craft.
   The Small Vessel Security Strategy seeks to prevent small vessels from being used as floating car bombs or waterborne improved explosive devices, as a near-shore platform for firing shoulder-mounted missiles, rocket-propelled grenade or other weapons at port facilities, cruise vessels and tankers, or as means for smuggling terrorists or weapons of mass destruction into the country.
   In recent months, department officials have begun to emphasize the need to devote more attention to other border security threats, such as small vessels and general aviation, beyond cargo, port and airline security. The line of argument is intended in part to blunt congressional calls for more container security measures, such as 100-percent scanning of all ocean boxes that would absorb a large portion of the department’s budget. The Bush administration doesn’t believe the cost justifies the marginal benefit beyond the existing layered defenses of targeted inspections, data collection, industry security partnerships and radiation detection.
   “As you know, we’ve put a considerable amount of effort over time in building the capability to detect and prevent smuggling radioactive materials in cargo containers,' Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff said in a speech to the National Marine Manufacturers Association’s small boat conference. 'But, it’s foolish to assume that the only way somebody could bring a weapon of mass destruction or a radioactive weapon into the country by sea would be to load it into a big container. What they could also do would be to charter an oceangoing yacht and smuggle it in that way.
   “This is a question of balance. Because we put so much effort into focusing on avoiding the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction in containers, I think there’s been a tendency to undervalue or give too little consideration to the possibility of a small boat as an alternative way to smuggle that weapon of mass destruction through the maritime domain,” he said.
   A key component of the small boat strategy is designed to coordinate the efforts of government, the private sector, international partners and recreational boaters to detect criminal or terrorist activity because law enforcement cannot maintain constant vigil over thousands of miles of coast, waterways and ports where large commercial vessels commingle with small boats. There are an estimated 17 million small boats, passenger ferries and personal watercraft operated on U.S. waterways each year.
   Other aspects of the small vessel strategy include:
   ' Better identification of small vessels operating in U.S. waters.
   ' Expanded radiological and nuclear detection capabilities.
   ' Improved situational awareness and information sharing.
   ' Enhanced data analysis to identify high-risk concerns.
   ' Leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine intent and when necessary, interdict small vessels.
   Last fall, local authorities in the Seattle area began checking for the presence of nuclear weapons and radioactive material on pleasure craft, tugboats and other small vessels as part of a three-year demonstration program that also includes San Diego. DHS is equipping the Coast Guard, harbor police and other emergency responders in Puget Sound with the latest handheld and mobile passive radiation detection devices.
   The radiation detectors are the first attempt by the government to prevent the use of small watercraft to smuggle a nuclear weapon or component into the country or launch a USS Cole-style suicide attack on an oil tanker, port terminal or other critical infrastructure.
   DHS plans to focus on distributing handheld, backpack and mobile radiation detection units to local authorities for use during routine marine operations, such as safety inspections, traffic enforcement, navigational assistance, or searches based on specific intelligence. The goal is to study the reliability and ease of use of the devices and how they need to be adapted for the marine environment.
   Department officials indicated at the time that patrol boats outfitted with small devices might be able to monitor commercial fishing vessels and other small craft as they pass through the channel entrance because the close proximity to the natural flow of traffic. The goal is to non-intrusively monitor for dirty bomb or nuclear threats without stopping vessels for inspections.

Chertoff

   Chertoff also said he wants to strengthen America’s Waterways Watch, which relies on the boating public to work with the Coast Guard in a maritime neighborhood watch program to report suspicious activity.
   The strategy also envisions better information sharing among government entities to develop a comprehensive awareness of the maritime domain. It envisions integrating the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Pleasure Boat Reporting System, the Coast Guard’s Vessel Identification System, other Coast Guard marine information, the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration’s Vessel Monitoring System that tracks more than 5,900 small vessels and its database that tracks investigations, incidents and activities, as well as information from the State Department, foreign governments and trusted-traveler programs to identify potential risks.
   The effort to improve data analysis includes expanding the Coast Guard’s 96-hour rule for advance notice of arrival by large vessels. Chertoff proposed reducing the tonnage requirement for vessels that fall within the rule so that border agencies can conduct risk analysis of incoming vessels and determine which may need to be boarded at sea.
   Chertoff also said he wanted to use small vessel identification systems, GPS or cell-phone-based devices to conduct surveillance and track small boat traffic in certain areas, particularly near high-risk critical infrastructure such as an oil refinery or nuclear power plant.
   “We’re not looking to have big brother on the sea, but we do need to start to look at some of the areas of risk to make sure we have a visibility to who’s moving around in those areas,” he said.
   DHS also wants to promote research into small-vessel barriers, warning devices and non-lethal deterrents to protect critical infrastructure, as well as a method for distinguishing between intentional and innocent intrusions into security and safety zones, the secretary said.
   DHS must still develop a more detailed plan to implement the small vessel security strategy. The department said it probably would not release the implementation plan to the public for security reasons, but plans to communicate steps that all stakeholders can take to improve maritime security.
   To read the entire Small Vessel Security Strategy, go to www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf ' Eric Kulisch