GAO knocks BIS method of monitoring ?dual use? exports

GAO knocks BIS method of monitoring ôdual useö exports    A congressional watchdog agency report found serious on-going flaws in the way the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Sercurity regulates exports of 'dual use' exports, or items with both commercial and military applications.
   The Government Accountability Office report, released on the agency's Web site on Wednesday, was sent to the office of Rep. Henry J. Hyde, R-Ill., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, on June 26.
   The report said BIS has 'not systemically evaluated the (dual-use export control) system to determine whether it is meeting its stated goal of protecting U.S. national security and economic interests.'
   Further, the GAO report faulted BIS for its failure to more closely study export licensing information to determine what dual-use items have actually been exported.
   The GAO report said BIS relies too heavily on 'limited measures of efficiency that focus only on narrow aspects of the license application review process to assess the system's performance.
   'BIS officials use intelligence reports and meetings with industry to gauge how the system is operating,' the report said.
   The GAO report noted that after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks BIS carried out an 'ad-hoc review' of its dual-use program to see whether changes were needed. BIS did not find the need to make substantial changes, only adjustments to the way it monitors exports of chemical and biological agents.
   The GAO said it was 'unable to assess the sufficiency of the review and resulting charges because BIS officials did not document their review.'
   The GAO report also found omissions on the watchlist BIS uses to screen export license applications. Specifically, the GAO identified 147 parties who had either violated U.S. export controls, raised suspicions of BIS officers, or been reported to the State Department for committing acts of terror that were not on the watchlist of about 50,000 names.
   'Reasons for the omissions include a lack of specific criteria as to who should be on the watchlist and BIS's failure to regularly review the list,' the GAO report said. 'In addition, a technical limitation in BIS's computerized screening system results in some parties on license applications not being automatically screened against the watchlist.'
   Finally, the report said BIS has failed to fully implement prior GAO recommendations, such as clarifying which items fall under BIS's export licensing jurisdiction. 'BIS has yet to take corrective action on this matter,' the GAO report said.
   David H. McCormick, the Commerce Department's undersecretary for industry and security, faulted the report's findings in a June 7 letter to the GAO.
   Under the heading 'BIS Game Plan,' McCormick’s letter said his agency 'continuously evaluates its priorities to adapt them to the requirements of the post-September 11 world. BIS then employs a systematic approach to measuring its performance against its priorities.'
   Among other concerns with the report, McCormick said the 'draft report fails to note that no export licenses were issued to any of the 147 entities in question.'
   GAO, however, stands firm on its findings, stating that the report 'fairly represents BIS's actions and the need for an overall evaluation framework.'
   The complete GAO report is available on line at https://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-638.