NTSB adds VDR transcript to El Faro public docket

The audio transcript from the ill-fated TOTE Maritime cargo vessel’s voyage data recorder was one of five factual reports added to the investigation docket, the National Transportation Safety Board said in a statement.    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has added five factual reports to its investigation docket for the El Faro, including the audio transcript from the ill-fated TOTE Maritime cargo ship’s voyage data recorder (VDR), the agency said in a statement.
   The El Faro sank Oct. 1, 2015 near the Bahamas after sailing into the path of Hurricane Joaquin, claiming the lives of all 33 crew members on board.
   Wreckage from the ship, which was en route from Jacksonville, Fla. to San Juan, Puerto Rico at the time of the incident, was discovered by NTSB investigators on Oct. 31. With the assistance of the U.S. Navy, NTSB in April returned to the wreck to search for its VDR, sometimes referred to as a “black box,” which was buried under about 15,000 feet of water.
   The board retrieved the El Faro’s VDR on Aug. 8 and has since been investigating its contents, which included over 26 hours of bridge audio and weather and navigational data.
   Other factual reports added to the docket included those from the Electronic Data Group, Meteorology Group, Survival Factors Group, and Engineering Group, NTSB said.
   According to the board, the Engineering Group Factual Report contains information regarding the El Faro’s machinery, the specifications and history of the vessel, maintenance and inspection, its safety management system, and the training and experience of its engineering staff.
   The Survival Factors Group Factual Report includes information on the U.S. Coast Guard’s search and rescue efforts, the El Faro’s survival equipment, crew preparedness, lifeboat standards and regulations, and distress transmissions.
   The Electronic Data Group Factual Report provides a systems overview and discussion of data recovered from the El Faro’s VDR and other onboard electronic systems. Data gathered included bridge audio, date, time, VDR power supply status, position and other GPS data, heading, course, speed, rate of turn, winds, and Automatic Identification System (AIS) information.
   The Meteorology Group Factual Report details what weather information was available to the El Faro’s crew before and during the incident.
   NTSB said it considers the information captured in the VDR’s bridge audio recording critical to determining the events leading up to the loss of the El Faro. It characterized the audio recording, captured by six microphones throughout the bridge, as “poor quality,” containing high levels of background noise, meaning extensive filtering was required in order to discern the details.
   After listening to the entire 26-hour recording several times, board investigators determined 10 hours of audio to be relevant to the investigation and transcribed it to a 500-plus page report, the longest ever produced by the NTSB.
   The board gave the following summary of the contents of the audio transcript report:
     • The bridge audio recording began about 5:37 a.m., Sept. 30, 2015, roughly eight hours after the El Faro departed Jacksonville, Fla.
     • The first recorded conversation about the forecasted weather was captured the morning of Sept. 30, between the captain and chief mate, who agreed on a course diversion they believed would keep them sufficiently clear of the eye of Hurricane Joaquin. There were multiple conversations regarding weather and route planning throughout the day and evening of Sept. 30.
     • The captain departed the bridge at about 8 p.m. Sept. 30, and returned at about 4:10 a.m. Oct 1. At about 4:37 a.m. the chief mate received a phone call from the chief engineer regarding the vessel’s list and engine oil levels. This appears to be the first recorded conversation about these issues. The information was related to the captain. The alternate chief engineer is heard stating at about 5:12 a.m. that he’s never seen the ship with such a list.
     • At about 5:43 a.m. the captain takes a phone call and indicates there is a problem in the number three hold of the ship and sends the chief mate to investigate. They discuss suspected flooding over UHF radio, which appears to be the first recorded conversation about a flooding condition on the ship.
     • The captain indicates at about 6:13 a.m. that the ship lost propulsion. Numerous conversations are heard throughout the remainder of the recording about the ship’s flooding condition, attempts to rectify the ship’s list and attempts to regain propulsion.
     • The second mate began formatting a GMDSS distress message at about 6:32 a.m. as directed by the captain. At 7:07 a.m. the captain notified Tote Service’s designated shoreside representative of the critical situation and that he was preparing to send an electronic distress signal. The captain instructed the second mate to send the distress message at about 7:13 a.m. The captain gave the command to sound the ship’s general alarm at about 7:27 a.m., and about two minutes later, the second mate exclaimed there were containers in the water and the captain gave the command to sound the abandon ship alarm. About four minutes later, the captain relayed over the UHF radio to put the life rafts in the water.
     • The bridge audio recording ended at about 7:40 a.m. Oct. 1, 2015, with the captain and one of the helmsmen still present on the bridge.
   The NTSB public docket contains factual information collected by investigators only in an effort to keep the general public informed about the investigation. Any analysis, findings or recommendations on the part of the NTSB will be included in the board’s final report, expected to be released some time in the next six months or so.