Risky preoccupation with boxes and gadgets

Risky preoccupation with boxes and gadgets
On Second Thought …
Thomas Timlen
Asia liaison officer,
BIMCO
tt@bimco.org

      January's American Shipper provided in-depth coverage and commentary on the U.S. government's activities in achieving 100 percent scanning of all U.S.-bound containers prior to loading at non-U.S. ports.
      Supporters of 100 percent scanning say it will significantly protect the United States from the threat of terrorist attacks in one form or another. On the other hand there are critics for the concept, a measure often described as 'draconian.'
      BIMCO has often expressed support for screening rather than 100 percent scanning. The present multilayered U.S. approach to maritime security, recently augmented by the Importer Security Filing reporting requirements, enable officials to enforce security measures and to conduct improved screening aimed at focusing attention (and resources) on consignments that are more likely to pose a security risk, while protecting the free movement of 'innocent' cargo.
      The same challenges identified several years ago ' inadequate technology and insufficient manpower ' are still cited as grounds to postpone implementing 100 percent scanning at foreign ports from 2012 to 2014.
      The preoccupation with 100 percent scanning could shift attention away from proven systems and programs aimed at enhancing security throughout the global supply chain ' arrangements that may be more efficient and cost-effective than the scanning requirement and that take account of all ships, not just the containerships.
      If it is ever implemented, the scan-all approach could create a sense of false security as containers pass through various combinations of radiation detection devices and imaging scanners. Scanning alone will not guarantee the boxes are free of content that can be used to execute acts of terrorism. The rented moving van packed with fertilizer soaked with racing fuel that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 would not have triggered a radiation detector. Nor would a container packed with a similar deadly cargo. Whether the scanned image of such a container would lead to closer inspection will depend on whether adequately trained eyes are available to detect something amiss.
      This preoccupation with scanning containers also distracts attention from other modes of transport that can be compromised by those seeking to do harm or move their wares across international borders.
      For all the talk of containers loaded with dirty bombs and components that can be assembled into weapons of mass destruction, we must remember there have been actual cases that did not involve containers at all. Recall the 2002 incident in which scud missiles destined for Yemen were discovered hidden beneath a cargo of bagged cement. U.S. intelligence reportedly tracked the ship for several days, until it was intercepted by two Spanish naval ships participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, a U.S.'led global antiterrorism coalition.
      There are thousands of ships moving cargoes such as bagged cement, and neither the ships nor their cargoes pass through scanning equipment. Potential terrorists would likely focus on these ships for convenient means of international transport if the scan-all mandate is implemented.
      Another security concern in the 1990s, drug smuggling onboard ships, was met with a similar preoccupation with cargo containers. While drug smugglers did find containers useful in getting illegal cargo across borders, they found it equally attractive to pack large quantities of drugs in various concealed places onboard ships not transporting containers at all. Drugs have been discovered hidden by divers in the sea chests (the grated water intakes below the waterline) of bulk cargo ships, in torpedo-like tubes bolted to the hulls of ships, in rudder trunks and under cargo hold gratings on reefer ships. Materials even more destructive than drugs could similarly be concealed in such spaces.
   The scan-all attraction for some may be due to the perceived simplicity of such an approach. The concept is easily understood, however, few fully understand the practicalities of container movements throughout the supply chain, particularly at the terminals.
      As American Shipper reported, scanning trials uncovered operational challenges, such as the onerous burden of scanning high volumes of containers transshipped within a port. The best rate of scanning was 86 percent, achieved among a handful of terminals moving less than 3 percent of the 10 million containers shipped to the United States annually.
      One scanning trial also revealed a lack of incentives, as containers scanned and cleared of suspicion received no preferential treatment on arrival at U.S. ports.
      So if 100 percent scanning is not the solution, what can be done? Regulators, politicians and the public would surely benefit from an enhanced awareness of initiatives already in place and others that have the potential to significantly improve supply chain security.
      Key to many initiatives is establishing cooperation among all stakeholders. This approach has worked in the war on drugs. Ship owners supported U.S. Customs' anti-drug smuggling programs, providing thousands of extra eyes and ears to detecting and reporting suspicious activity that could be connected with drug smuggling.
      Long before 9/11, shipping companies have worked with customs agencies throughout the world, sharing information and best practices that have prevented criminal acts involving merchant ships. Such cooperation can significantly enhance the security of the supply chain.
      Measures developed by the World Customs Organization are a useful step towards further enhancing industry/government cooperation. This, combined with engaging the intelligence community to monitor and infiltrate terrorist and criminal groups, should contribute towards enhanced security at the ports and terminals of the world in a more efficient and cost-effective way.