Self-defenseless

Self-defenseless Vessel security measures, insurance coverage, called inadequate.

   Governments and industry groups in recent years have issued joint recommendations for steps that merchant ships and crews can take to reduce their risk of being attacked or captured by pirates. But critics say some of the recommendations are unrealistic or that ship owners are unwilling to invest in the full range of equipment to meet the highest level of security.
   'Security on commercial vessels is still pretty lax,' said James Staples, who retired in 2010 as a captain for U.S.-flag carrier Waterman Steamship Corp. after 30 years at sea in the Middle East and Far East.
   Crews are stretched thin trying to maintain security under difficult conditions and often don't have access to the best gear, he said.
   Companies could be taking many more precautions for vessels, from better door locks to thermal imaging cameras, to night-vision goggles, according to the veteran shipmaster. Many of these steps are listed in the third version of Best Management Practices (BMP 3), issued in June 2010 by the International Maritime Organization in conjunction with industry groups and naval forces.
   Vessels, Staples said, should have cipher locks (opened with a keypad) or smart-card locks similar to those used on hotel room doors that can be reprogrammed to change individual access rights as the crew changes. Most onboard locks require keys that anybody can walk off with, and potentially give to criminal elements, if they abandon the ship. The locks primarily provide security in port, but also can temporarily keep pirate boarding parties out of certain rooms during a hijacking.
   Monitoring a huge ship is difficult even in port, but is more so when crewmembers are tired from constantly rotating 24-hour watches looking for unlit boats. Roll-on/roll-off vessels can have up to 12 decks to patrol. Crews, which typically number 15 to 20 persons, have to keep watch in port when longshoremen are loading and unloading vessels and when authorities or vendors join the vessel through the Suez Canal to make sure there are no security breaches. After all that, they then have to maintain extra vigilance while sailing through pirate zones. Thermal imaging and closed-circuit television cameras would help crews get enough rest and serve as a forensic tool to investigate any security breaches, Staples said.

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   Thermal imaging cameras, which pick up the infrared heat signatures of objects and organisms and translate them into images, are important aids to detecting approaching boats at night from great distances, he said.
   Relying on radar isn't considered sufficient because it only shows a blip on a screen, not the size or type of craft that is approaching, and its accuracy highly depends on sea conditions and atmospherics.
   Staples, a certified vessel security officer who provides maritime consulting and security services through his company OceanRiver LLC, said thermal imaging systems can also help avoid collisions with small boats in high traffic areas and comply with U.S. environmental requirements for avoiding endangered right whales along the East Coast. Under the rules, vessels must reduce speed in certain areas of the North and South Atlantic, follow designated channel approaches, and report sightings or strikes. The equipment will pick up the heat signature of the whale as it comes to the surface for air.
   'We're taught as mariners to get at least three different types of navigational bearings to get a fix,' Staples said. 'The same thing should be required for detecting bad guys. You should use radar, thermal imaging and night vision equipment.'
   Staples, and another captain whose name is not being used because he is still employed within the industry, said crews would benefit from better quality night-vision equipment that extracts the light reflected off objects and amplifies it so they can be seen clearly.
   Private security companies hired by U.S. shipping lines are using low-end versions of the night glasses because they don't want to deal with extensive paperwork to obtain a U.S. export license for military-grade technology and restrictions that the equipment can't leave the vessel, Staples said.
   It costs more than $100,000 to outfit a small detachment with top-flight equipment, including weapons, scopes, night vision goggles, communications and medical gear, he said.
   'What it comes down to is cost per day for these security teams. So a lot of them are out there with minimal equipment, such as M-4 (rifles) and shotguns, rather than having a longer-range rifle like a Barrett.'
   Low-budget security teams, he said, have to keep their capital investments down because the $4,000 daily fee they receive on average from the vessel operator barely covers the guards' salaries. Competition among private contractors is forcing them to compete on price. A top professional paramilitary unit, by comparison, can cost tens of thousands of dollars for a three- or four-day voyage.
   'Everything else in the maritime world has standards. Radars, GPS, communication systems and so on have to meet a regulated standard to be onboard that vessel. For these security companies, there's no standard for what type of equipment is needed,' Staples said.
   Each company uses different rifles, binoculars, night-vision goggles and other equipment with varying degrees of quality or suitability for the maritime environment, he added.
   BMP 3 also says shipping companies should consider providing crews with Kevlar vests, helmets and sandbags to protect them from gunfire. Staples said protective gear of that sort is rarely, if ever, found on commercial vessels unless they are working for the U.S. government under a military contract.
   Mannequins placed on deck are also effective, but rarely used. Staples said he requisitioned them several times, but never received any from Waterman Steamship.
   'So I had to make our own out of boiler suits stuffed with rags and mops for heads. They were effective because it made it look like we had more people on the rails than we did,' he said.
   In an era of slow steaming to counter high fuel prices, many captains are under pressure to run at high speed only if a pirate threat is detected, Staples said. His own policy, he said, was to operate at full sea speed (going at top speed can cause engine trouble) all the way through the Indian Ocean ' not just in the immediate high-risk area ' and justify the fuel expense later.
   'These are the types of things owners can do, but it means reaching into their pocket and spending money,' Staples said.
   But Henrik Kragh, Maersk Line's head of anti-piracy coordination, responded that 'BMP is not a one-size-fits-all and the potential self-protection measures should be applied based on a voyage assessment.'
   Other guidelines for dealing with terrorists do little to increase security, according to Staples. Firing fire hoses when underway is like using a garden hose because the wind vaporizes the water and creates a light mist by the time it reaches the waterline and the pirates trying to board. He said barbed wire is not an effective deterrent and actually creates more of a danger to the crew. And the only way to get rid of it is to cut it and dump it in the sea, which causes problems for fishermen and the environment.
   'But it's a cheap way out for the companies to do something,' Staples said.
   Jakob Larsen, maritime security officer for independent maritime organization BIMCO, disagreed about the utility of fire hoses and barbed wire.
   'Water and wire are of use ' ask anyone who has tried to board a ship. The more water and wire the better. Razor wire, or concertina wire, is generally more effective than barbed wire. To handle razor wire in a safe manner requires some planning, time, skill and proper personal protection, but the danger associated with the handling is normally far less than that posed by the pirates,' he said.
   'Pirates are looking at ships carefully to see if they can spot weaknesses. If you're putting on a show of preparedness, then they'll think once or twice' about proceeding with an attack, added Martin Murphy, a visiting fellow at the Corbett Center for Maritime Policy Studies at King's College in London.
   One Earth Future Foundation, a non-profit organization trying to coordinate collaborative approaches to solving piracy, also is critical of some self-protection measures espoused by maritime authorities and industry groups.
   The IMO's document highly recommends the creation of a citadel room with a fortified door where the crew can safely hide and override controls on the bridge if the vessel is boarded by pirates. A well-constructed sanctuary would include self-contained air conditioning, emergency rations, water supply, good external communications, emergency shut-down capabilities for the main and auxiliary engines, and remotely controlled camera feeds.
   But One Earth Future said in a recent report that the strong room's description 'may lead to a false expectation that the crew is completely safe within a citadel, and disregards the fear that crewmembers experience when under direct attack by pirates, and that crews may spend days in the citadels awaiting military response.'
   Meanwhile, pirates are finding creative ways to breach the citadel rooms. The gang that captured the Beluga Nomination earlier this year used welding equipment to cut its way into the room and reach the crew. According to an account on the United Filipino Seafarers Web site about the 30-hour siege on the Arillah in early April, pirates burned ropes and wood near the ventilation system that supplied air to the citadel in an effort to smoke out the crew, tried to set fire to the doors and used hand grenades in an effort to break in. Special Forces from the United Arab Emirates eventually arrived to rescue the crew and capture the pirates.
   The safe rooms should only be used if the crew has contacted naval forces and verified that a rescue mission is possible, One Earth Future said.

BMB 5. Michael Frodl, a Washington-based attorney who heads boutique risk analysis firm C-Level Maritime Risks, said BMP 3 is becoming discredited and that the industry needs to ratchet up its security playbook a couple of levels.
   The consensus recommendations for vessel security off Somalia offer some good self-defense ideas, but as a whole fall short in protecting the ship owner or operator from legal liability, he said. The industry's security playbook mainly provides a limited deterrence benefit if pirates observe barbed wire and other signs that a vessel is prepared, but few ways to stop a determined group of pirates. Even the fourth edition of BMP being finalized by the shipping industry ' which is expected to further address safe rooms and armed guards and include a new section on how best to assist law enforcement authorities with post-hijack investigations ' will be insufficient, according to the analyst.
   What would a 'BMP 5,' or five-layered security, look like?
   It would cover every recommended security precaution listed in the current guidelines, plus recommendations for better use of armed private guards to repulse pirates, better-designed citadel rooms, real-time intelligence to avoid attacks, and well-targeted insurance coverage, according to Frodl.
   BMP 3 is 'a waste of money because you're asking people to spend tons of money on stuff that isn't going to get them out of court,' Frodl told American Shipper.
   The supercharged BMP, he said, would create a minimum standard of risk attenuation that can forestall victim lawsuits by demonstrating that a company did everything possible to protect the ship, cargo and crew.
   The guidelines on maintaining full speed in high-risk areas of pirate activity are flawed, for example, because the conflict with broader corporate guidance from vessel companies for reduced speed to save money at a time of extremely expensive bunker fuel, he said.
   'You don't know when to speed up without the best available intelligence because BMP 3 doesn't require it,' Frodl said.
   Following recommendations to avoid pirate areas would essentially mean avoiding the entire Indian Ocean, which carriers can't afford to do. But good intelligence on pirate activity is very limited, so captains don't know whether to change course or go at full speed with exhausted crewmembers on constant watch for multiple days, Frodl said.
   Vessels try to pick and chose when to travel at full speed because doing so eats up a lot of fuel and significantly raises costs, which can't be recouped from cargo customers. Waiting until pirates are spotted is dangerous because large vessels need 45 minutes to reach full speed.
   BMPs are excellent if a vessel has advance intelligence, because then all the crew can be on watch and activate defensive tactics, thereby denying pirates the element of surprise, Frodl said.
   He called for the creation of a new information clearinghouse supported by all stakeholders that would enable rapid two-way sharing of data on pirate activity.
   The International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center, part of the International Chamber of Commerce, is supported by shippers and ship owners, and has a limited focus. The IMO is affiliated with the United Nations and subject to political considerations. The United Kingdom's Maritime Trade Operations center and the European Union's Maritime Security Center for the Horn of Africa collect information from vessels moving through the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor, but vessel operators complain that they don't get enough information in return.
   Under a new authority, ship owners, cargo customers, underwriters, governments, non-governmental organizations, and seafarers would provide communal data and financial support for the database, Frodl said.
   The idea is to merge various incident reports, intelligence, threat analyses, updates on how pirates respond to various military and self-defense tactics, and other information into a single database to present a common view of the pirate situation. Captains could consult the database for the latest data to plot their paths and avoid pirates.
   Working from a common set of facts, Frodl said, will help stakeholders make policy and operational decisions.
   'Right now every sector seems to have its own intel about what's going on, and that's leading to stovepiping and inability to agree on strategy and tactics,' he said. Various organizations or companies could apply computerized analytic programs to the data to extract even more context-specific insight that can be acted upon, he added.
   When self-defense tactics aren't sufficient, such as for slow bulk vessels, well-trained, private paramilitary detachments are a good idea, he added. But shipping companies are under pressure to shell out for top-of-the-line security, which is unnecessary unless a vessel is carrying spent nuclear fuel, high-value persons or a critical commodity, he said. There are many ex-Marines that can provide more cost-effective vessel security and still meet industry standards for professional conduct.
   'You don't need former maritime special forces to guard an oil tanker or a box ship with flat-screen TVs,' Frodl said.
   Unfortunately, Frodl said, most protection teams don't have a backup plan in case they are unable to prevent pirates from taking over a vessel. That's why vessels still require a fortress room so the guards and crew can mount a tactical retreat and remain safe for 72 hours. The maritime community needs to develop more detailed standards for these chambers, which should include a fully armored door and roof that can resist rocket-propelled grenades and acetylene torches, a separate ventilation and air cleaning system, and an independent communication system in case the ship's antenna or wires are destroyed, he said.
   The problem, Frodl said, is that many ship owners still play the odds, figuring there is a one in thousand chance of getting hijacked and paying a $5 million ransom, which equates to roughly $5,000 per transit in cost when divided across a thousand voyages. That's 10 times less than the $50,000 a carrier might pay for a top-notch security team on a single trip. And it means security costs up to $5,000 are justified, but beyond that the direct cost of security is more than the risk exposure.
   Vessel operators can buy $5 million of coverage for about $15,000 per voyage, half the peak rate in 2008, according to William Miller, a divisional director with Willis Group Holdings Plc in London. Insurance premiums for kidnap-and-ransom coverage, which vary depending on the speed, freeboard and onboard security capabilities, have dropped substantially in the past 20 months as insurers seek to attract more business.
   Their calculation overlooks the fact that the ransom is only half to one-third of the cost related to a hijacking. Indirect costs include:
   ' Legal fees.
   ' A security team for making aerial cash drops to the pirates.
   ' Hull repairs to remove barnacle buildup.
   ' Engine repairs necessitated by accumulated oil sludge.
   ' Medical and psychological treatment and other care for crews.
   ' Lost income and loss of goodwill ' or one's reputation as a reliable and safe transport provider.
   But the carriers often still can't justify paying for armed guards even at a $10,000 to $15,000 exposure for transiting the Indian Ocean.
   Frodl's final layer of anti-piracy protection is a full-cost accounting insurance policy that covers the direct and indirect costs of a hijacking.
   'I think the new standard on the part of the insurance industry to deal with Somali piracy is that they have a minimum $10 million direct and indirect-cost cover,' Frodl suggested.
   Insurance companies are not providing a full enough spectrum of coverage. After a ship is hijacked, a ship owner may feel that he or she paid too much for too little claims relief, he said.
   At the same time, insurance brokers are not raising enough money and need to raise premiums or get out of the business, he acknowledged. Insurers have begun to recalculate premiums and reserves in the wake of huge ransoms that have been paid in recent months.
   Frodl advised ship owners not to fight for lower premiums for hull and kidnap-and-ransom coverage that is only limited to direct costs, but to demand coverage of indirect costs in exchange for paying more.
   'If rates increase 50 percent, ask for 200 percent more cover,' he said.