Sober security

Sober security       It appears the once vehement congressional effort to show the world that the United States can successfully mandate 100 percent scanning of inbound ocean containers has started to sober.
      Noisy lawmakers, such as Sen. Charles Schumer of New York and New Jersey's Sen. Frank Lautenberg, who once drank deep from the well of absolutist theories about 100 percent scanning, are now strangely silent. This was noted by Associate Editor Eric Kulisch during an early December Senate hearing in which Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said the 2012 scan-all deadline could not be met.
      Napolitano told the senators that border regulators here and abroad still lack the appropriate technology and software, and suffer from logistical and human resource limitations. Instead, she said the department has decided to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports through July 2014.
      These lawmakers now realize they were off the mark on how best to secure the nation's borders against terrorists hiding weapons inside cargo. In fact, I don't even hear pro-Iraq surge advocate Sen. John McCain of Arizona complaining that this is an 'arbitrary deadline.' Many members of Congress have publicly acknowledged that the scanning mandate was unrealistic or that the Department of Homeland Security's layered approach to security is working. During the next several years, there may even be an attempt to quietly introduce legislation that effectively ends the pursuit of 100 percent container scanning and replace it with something more reasonable ' we hope.
      That's not to say that we should neglect cargo security. In fact, the pursuit of 100-percent inspection of cargo destined for passenger planes may be viable in that it's a smaller, more controlled stream of freight then the voluminous ocean transportation sector.
      However, there are no guarantees that terrorists won't attempt to use an ocean container to smuggle a dirty bomb into the country. That's why it's essential to develop a more realistic approach to targeting the most risky container trades, based on those previously prescribed measures by the World Customs Organization and leading security experts.
      We need to pursue a security methodology that incorporates intelligence-based targeting by working together with major trading nations through common procedures and data sharing. The absence of comprehensive scanning, however, means that the new U.S. advance import data program, known as '10+2,' better be robust enough to flag potential threats.
      A 100 percent scanning regime is a bridge too far at this time because the software that could automatically detect bombs hidden in cargo containers is not ready. As long as image analysis is done by humans it will be too labor intensive and subject to error to incorporate on a mass scale.
      Nonetheless, Stephen Flynn, a noted U.S. security expert, poses an interesting alternative solution that attempts to address some of the limitations of the current technology and use of government screeners. He argues that turning over the process to the maritime industry could be done in a cost-effective way that addresses the security concerns of Congress and makes global supply chains better able to sustain operations in the event of a terror attack (see article at www.AmericanShipper.com/web). A scanning and radiation detection system that doesn't add any extra time to the movement of goods is like an insurance policy in case the risk-based assessment methods that dictate low inspection levels don't work.
      Many of the world's global terminal operators have the financial and technical wherewithal to develop and support this type of security activity if they know they can recoup their investment from customers. Shippers who want the least amount of inspections and peace of mind that their freight is safe and secure will pay a moderate fee for this service.
      Industry opposition to 100 percent scanning as spelled out in the U.S. law is certainly justified, given the potential costs and disruptions. But the data collection and requirements involved with '10+2,' also known as the Importer Security Filing, are not without substantial upfront and ongoing costs. A study comparing the per-shipment cost for complying with '10+2' and Flynn's global scanning approach would be a worthy exercise to get beyond assumptions and determine the most efficient approach. .