How a Carrier Lost Payment on 62 Loads After an Impostor Theft — and Why the Industry Should Pay Attention

What the Illyrian Transport dispute reveals about fraud, verification failures, and payment offsets in trucking

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Key Takeaways:

  • An impostor, using Illyrian Transport's compromised email, fraudulently arranged a freight shipment, which was then picked up by a different carrier due to multiple failures in verification by the broker and shipper.
  • The broker (ITS Logistics) subsequently withheld payment for 62 *unrelated* loads that Illyrian had legitimately completed, asserting a right of offset despite Illyrian's non-involvement in the fraudulent shipment.
  • This incident spotlights critical industry issues like increasing impostor fraud, inadequate verification processes, and the devastating financial impact of broad payment offsets on innocent carriers, prompting regulatory investigations into liability and surety bond functions.
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This case didn’t start with a late invoice or a billing disagreement. It started with an impostor.

In early 2025, Illyrian Transport LLC — a federally authorized motor carrier — became entangled in a dispute that exposes some of the freight industry’s most uncomfortable fault lines: identity theft, weak verification practices, and the growing use of payment offsets that can cripple a carrier even when it never touched the freight in question.

What followed wasn’t just a stolen shipment. It was a chain reaction that left dozens of completed, unrelated loads unpaid — and raised serious questions about how responsibility is assigned when fraud enters the system upstream.

The Load Illyrian Never Knew Existed

The incident began when a freight tender from ITS Logistics, a licensed property broker, was sent to an email address Illyrian had previously used during onboarding. Unknown to Illyrian, that email account had been compromised.

The impostor intercepted communications, blocked Illyrian from seeing the tender, and proceeded as if they were the carrier.

Illyrian never received the tender. Never accepted the load. Never dispatched a driver. Never knew the shipment existed.

The impostor arranged the pickup, and the shipper released the freight to a truck clearly marked for a different motor carrier — Charlie’s Express, operated by Antonio Avila. CCTV footage and the driver’s license presented at pickup confirm that the freight was hauled by Charlie’s Express, not Illyrian.

Illyrian only became aware of the situation later, when ITS contacted them asking when the receiver could expect the truck to arrive — after shipment tracking showed the load nearing the consignee.

By then, the damage was already done.

Where Verification Broke Down

At multiple points in the chain, basic safeguards failed.

At the pickup location, the carrier name on the truck did not match the carrier ITS believed it had assigned. The driver’s identity did not match Illyrian. The MC and DOT numbers did not align. Despite these discrepancies, the freight was loaded and released.

Upstream, ITS relied primarily on email communication and did not verify tender acceptance through a phone call to Illyrian’s FMCSA-listed number. That single step — confirming acceptance via a verified contact — could have stopped the fraud before the load ever moved.

Illyrian reported the identity theft and filed an FBI report. But the most consequential part of the story was still ahead.

The Offset That Changed Everything

Illyrian had already completed 62 separate, unrelated loads for ITS, primarily on dedicated USPS mail lanes. Every one of those loads was delivered, invoiced, and uncontested.

Instead of paying Illyrian for those shipments, ITS withheld payment on all 62 loads, asserting a right of offset tied to the impostor theft.

From Illyrian’s perspective, the logic was fundamentally flawed.

Illyrian never accepted the disputed load. Never transported it. Never had custody of the freight.
Never signed for it.

Under long-standing industry principles, liability generally follows possession. In this case, the carrier that physically hauled the freight was a completely different company. Yet the financial burden landed squarely on Illyrian.

For a small or mid-sized carrier, having dozens of loads withheld — even temporarily — can be devastating.

Paperwork That Added to the Confusion

The dispute became more complex due to documentation issues.

The bill of lading and related claim paperwork listed “ITS Logistics” as the carrier of record, even though ITS was acting as a broker and no ITS-owned equipment or drivers were involved in the shipment.

ITS does operate an asset-based division under a separate DOT and MC number, using the same trade name. According to FMCSA’s SAFER database, that division runs approximately 54 trucks. This overlap further blurred carrier identification and complicated responsibility.

Based on the Continental Tire claim documentation provided, the carrier of record was listed as ITS Logistics — suggesting the shipper did not verify that the name on the paperwork matched the truck that physically picked up the load.

Illyrian disputes that any indemnification or offset provisions in its broker-carrier agreement were triggered, arguing that no contractual performance occurred because the tender was never accepted and the freight was never hauled by Illyrian.

Despite that, payment for dozens of completed loads remained withheld.

When Collections Enter the Picture

With no resolution in sight, Illyrian placed the unpaid invoices with its collections partner, Freight Recovery Specialists.

Jennifer Chrestman, CEO of Freight Recovery Specialists and a transportation veteran with more than two decades of experience, points to a double standard that often emerges in fraud cases.

“When a broker’s identity is compromised and an unsuspecting carrier hauls a load, the industry does not excuse nonpayment by saying the broker was a victim,” Chrestman said. “If that standard applies in one direction, it should apply in the other. The carrier should not be treated differently simply because the fraud occurred upstream.”

Surety Bonds — And Their Limits

Illyrian pursued claims under ITS’s BMC-84 surety bonds, which exist to protect carriers from broker nonpayment.

The withheld loads spanned a transition between two surety providers — first Great American Insurance Group, then Merchants Bonding Company. Claims were submitted to both for their respective coverage periods.

Both sureties declined payment, citing the broker’s assertion that the matter was disputed. In its denial correspondence, Great American stated that its bond protects against uncontested nonpayment of freight charges.

Freight Recovery Specialists subsequently filed complaints against both sureties with the FMCSA’s Office of Registration – Financial Responsibility and the U.S. Bureau of the Treasury’s Surety Bond program, alleging improper application of BMC-84 obligations.

According to email responses received by Freight Recovery Specialists, the FMCSA has confirmed receipt of the complaints and indicated the matters are under review.

Separately, a complaint was filed through the FMCSA’s National Consumer Complaint Database against ITS, raising concerns under 49 C.F.R. §371.7 related to misrepresentation and the improper offset of funds. The FMCSA issued a complaint reference number and has opened an investigation.

Why This Case Matters Beyond Illyrian

This situation is not isolated — but it is revealing.

Impostor theft is rising across the industry, with email compromise and digital impersonation becoming common entry points. Yet the downstream financial consequences often land on carriers, even when they had no knowledge of or involvement in the fraudulent shipment.

More troubling is the growing use of broad offsets: withholding payment on unrelated, completed freight to recover disputed losses. For carriers operating on thin margins, delayed or withheld payment across dozens of loads can quickly become existential.

At the same time, inconsistent verification practices at both the broker and shipper levels continue to allow fraud to pass undetected before freight ever moves.

The Larger Questions the Industry Can’t Avoid

The Illyrian Transport case raises uncomfortable but necessary questions:

  • How far does a broker’s responsibility extend in verifying carrier identity before tender and pickup?
  • When a carrier never accepts or hauls a load, should unrelated receivables be subject to offset?
  • Are surety bonds functioning as intended when disputes are asserted?
  • How should liability be allocated in an era of increasingly sophisticated digital fraud?

As regulators review the facts, the outcome may help clarify how responsibility is assigned when identity theft collides with freight payment practices.

For carriers, brokers, and shippers alike, the lesson is clear: verification failures at the front end can cascade into costly disputes — and how those disputes are handled may matter just as much as how fraud is prevented in the first place.

In today’s freight environment, trust isn’t assumed. It’s verified — or it becomes a liability.

Contributed Content

Note: FreightWaves occasionally publishes commentary from industry sources with expertise, information and opinion on current transportation topics. The opinions expressed in the article are solely those of the author and not necessarily those of FreightWaves. Submissions to FreightWaves are subject to editing.