OECD: Secure “outer edges” of container supply chains

OECD: Secure “outer edges” of container supply chains

OECD: Secure “outer edges” of container supply chains

   The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has urged governments to go beyond existing international agreements on maritime security and secure the remaining parts of the supply chains in container transport, particularly its inland elements.
   In a report on container transport security across all modes, the Paris-based think tank said addressing the security of the container transport chain requires a comprehensive intermodal framework integrating measures across the entire container transport chain.
   “Whereas such a framework may exist at the center of the chain covering ports and maritime transport, as codified in SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea convention of the International Maritime Organization) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security code, there is not yet an analogous framework for inland transport on the outer edges of the chain,” the OECD said.
   It recognized that elements of this framework are emerging through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program in U.S. trades and other initiatives from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the World Customs Organization and the European Commission. These initiatives are under development, but “none of these address the container transport chain in its entirety,” the OECD argued.
   “Transport authorities must address weak links of the container transport chain,” the OECD urged. Container transport is characterized by complex interactions among multiple actors, industries, regulatory agencies, modes, operating systems, liability regimes and legal frameworks, with inland operators the least secure under current regulations, the report said.
   “Many of the security concerns in the container transport chain are related to inland carriers and freight integrators operating in the first few and last few links of the chain.
   “These actors are numerous, disparate in nature and activity, operate on tight margins and, as a result, represent more of a security risk than their larger counterparts further down the chain (i.e., large land, port and maritime transport operators). It is on these larger actors and their activities that most international and bilateral security initiatives have been focused to date,” the OECD added.
   Because they are the only main actors with “real” contact with the contents of the container, shippers and those stuffing the container “must play a primary role in securing the container transport chain,” the OECD said. Accordingly, shippers or those stuffing a container should follow established security procedures, initiate an auditable custody trail and ensure that the container is sealed with, at a minimum, a high-security mechanical seal.
   These OECD recommendations on the importance of securing the container stuffing operation and ensuring the integrity of the container seal are similar to those issued jointly in 2003 by the National Industrial Transportation League, the Washington-based World Shipping Council and the International Mass Retail Association.
   According to the OECD report, transport authorities can play an important role to enhance security, in cases where terrorists seek to “hijack” a container and tamper with it, by enhancing security at all points along the chain.
   “This involves ensuring that transport operators take into account security measures relating to container integrity and sealing, securing the access to the container and facilitating container tracking — this is especially important for inland transport authorities who exercise oversight on the vulnerable outer links of the container transport chain,” it said. On the other hand, transport authorities have “considerably less scope for action” in thwarting an attack by terrorists who usurp or develop a legitimate trading identity to ship an illegitimate and dangerous consignment — a scenario described by the OECD as “Trojan horse.”
   The OECD noted that the threat of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon being delivered via an anonymous shipping container has made it to the forefront of the transport security debate and the “bomb in a box” scenario has become “a principal driver of international transport security policy since 2001.”
   The OECD security report is posted at https://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/8/31839546.pdf .