The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration is warning the trucking industry that buying, selling, or leasing MC numbers may violate federal regulations and could lead to enforcement action. The agency says operating authorities are not commodities and should not be transferred like equipment.
An operating authority represents the regulatory identity of a motor carrier and connects safety records, insurance filings, and compliance history to a specific company. When control of that authority quietly changes hands, the public record may no longer reflect who is actually running the operation.
A problem hiding in plain sight
Operating authorities were never intended to function as tradable assets. They exist so regulators, brokers, and shippers can identify who is responsible for moving freight.
Investigators have documented authorities being advertised online, transferred through informal brokers, or sold along with company email accounts and dispatch contacts. In some cases, entire “carrier packages” are marketed to operators who want to start moving freight quickly without building a legitimate operating history.
When that happens, the company listed in federal records may not be the company actually hauling freight. That gap makes it harder for brokers, shippers, and insurers to know who they are truly working with.
How authority trading connects to freight fraud
Unauthorized authority transfers have become tied to several fraud schemes affecting the trucking industry. In many cases the issue is not only regulatory compliance but the way carrier identities are used to move freight under false control.
Cargo theft rings and double brokering networks often rely on identity manipulation. Instead of creating new companies, criminals sometimes take control of existing authorities or obtain them from struggling carriers and begin operating under those identities.
Because the authority already has insurance filings and a history in brokerage systems, the operation can appear legitimate during an initial review. That credibility can allow fraudulent operators to book loads before deeper verification takes place.
Investigators say this tactic appears in several types of fraud activity.
• double brokering networks
• chameleon carriers operating under recycled identities
• cargo theft operations using purchased or stolen authorities
• identity impersonation schemes targeting legitimate carriers
In many investigations the authority listed in federal databases does not match the people actually controlling the operation.
The FMCSA’s enforcement position
The FMCSA bulletin makes the agency’s position clear. USDOT numbers and MC operating authorities cannot be transferred unless they move as part of a legitimate corporate transaction such as a merger, acquisition, or documented ownership change.
Attempts to buy, sell, lease, or rent authorities outside those circumstances can lead to enforcement actions.
Potential actions include:
• inactivation of the USDOT number
• revocation of operating authority
• cancellation of registrations
Losing operating authority can immediately prevent a carrier from moving interstate freight and disrupt normal business operations.
Why MC numbers are being bought and sold
Starting a new motor carrier takes time, and new authorities often face more scrutiny from brokers and shippers. Insurance costs can also be higher for new entrants, which makes older authorities appear more attractive.
For some operators, purchasing an existing authority may look like a shortcut into the market.
Investigations show these transactions are not hypothetical. In a December report published by The Bannon Report titled Age Is Not a Safety Signal: How Old MC Numbers Are Fueling New Fraud; investigators spoke with an individual who said they would sell their operating authority to the first buyer willing to show up with $20,000 in cash.
Situations like this demonstrate how authorities can quietly change hands outside any formal regulatory process.
What brokers and shippers should watch for
The FMCSA warning highlights why stronger verification practices are becoming more important when companies onboard carriers. A valid operating authority alone does not guarantee that the company presenting it is the legitimate holder.
Investigators often see warning signs before fraud occurs. These indicators can appear during the carrier onboarding process or during normal load communication.
Common indicators include:
• sudden changes in company contact information
• dispatchers using new phone numbers or unfamiliar email domains
• mismatched addresses or ownership records
• recently reactivated authorities with little operating history
• differences between insurance filings and carrier communication
These signals often appear before a load is stolen or double brokered.
Enforcement remains limited
The FMCSA can say authorities cannot be sold or leased, but detecting those transfers at scale is extremely difficult. There are more than 1.8 million entities registered with the USDOT in the United States, and ownership changes between small carriers rarely attract regulatory attention.
Investigations usually occur only when there is a major enforcement action, a catastrophic accident, or a formal complaint supported by strong evidence. Quiet handshake transfers of MC numbers often remain below that threshold.
Fraud actors only need a short window
Cargo theft and double brokering are short duration crimes. Fraud actors do not need a carrier authority to last for years.
They only need a believable identity, a working email address, a phone number, access to load boards, and a broker willing to tender freight. That combination can be enough to steal a load within hours.
By the time investigators discover the problem, the freight is often cross docked, resold, scrapped, or moved overseas. Even if FMCSA later revokes the authority, the theft has already happened, and the financial damage has already occurred.
The hard truth
The FMCSA is right to take this position. Operating authorities were never meant to be bought, sold, or leased outside legitimate ownership changes. The challenge is that the warning alone may not change the system that allows it.
Fraud actors only need small openings, and the freight system still provides many of them. Until those gaps are closed, authority misuse and freight fraud will continue in the shadows of the industry.
Click here for more articles on cargo theft and freight fraud by Phillip Brink.
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Dale Prax
There is a common perception that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has a “$1 billion budget” and should simply be doing more enforcement.
That perspective lacks context.
FMCSA’s FY2025 budget request is $964.55 million.
• Over $526 million (more than half) is allocated to state grant programs (MCSAP)
• A substantial portion funds personnel, systems, and operational infrastructure
• Only a limited share supports federal field enforcement
Now compare that to the Federal Aviation Administration budget of ~$25 billion to oversee:
• ~700,000 pilots
• ~215,000 aircraft
• ~2,000+ aviation operators
FMCSA has $1 Billion budget to oversee:
• ~9.2 million drivers
• ~8.4 million commercial vehicles
• ~2 million registered entities (~580,000 active carriers)
• ~25,000–30,000 brokers and forwarders
This is not a question of effort.
This is a matter of scale, structure, and resource allocation.
The current system cannot rely on audits and field enforcement alone. The math does not support it.
The path forward is prevention.
The FMCSA is responsible for regulation, registration, and enforcement.
The Freight industry operates in real time and has visibility into behaviors, patterns, and risks that do not appear in static government systems.
The private sector already possesses:
• Identity verification technologies
• Cross-platform data on entity relationships and reuse
• Visibility into dispatch, load, and payment behaviors
• Intelligence on chameleon carriers and undisclosed affiliations
This is actionable intelligence.
Alignment is no longer optional.
FMCSA leadership and industry vetting and onboarding platforms must work together to:
• Validate identity, ownership, and control at the point of entry
• Detect undisclosed affiliations and recycled authorities
• Flag high-risk applicants before authority is granted
• Prevent bad actors from entering the system in the first place
The agency is working to modernize registration.
The industry has already built the tools.
Now it’s time to connect them.
Fraud prevention starts at onboarding, not after the damage is done
James Simms
I don’t know how many times I’ve seen shady characters openly changing information on the sides of cab units (via video). A certain YouTube channel is leading the charge against fly by night & otherwise shady operators, I’ve seen TV stations do stories via YT after a major accident. Usually it takes a major catastrophe like outside Terrell, TX, or other instances where there are not only shady operators, but usually non domiciled, illegal drivers from other countries who can’t read, speak, or understand English.
The Administration is doing some things, but they really need to jump in & hit shady operators much harder than being done now.
J
There’s a company in chicago area who does this. I was hired by them as a driver and they actually didn’t even pay me when they said I’d be paid and did t pay my 2nd check either. I headed back home and returned their truck. I looked up these people(all from Serbia) some on the phone from other countries, wrong addresses, fake names etc. Its really hard to track these people down and sux for someone like myself who did the work and didn’t get paid. Hope they get busted
Brian Watt
FMCSA – Get out of your Glass House and into the field!
When Dad says, “Don’t make me come back there” on a road trip … he REALLY means it. FMCSA, use that $945 million dollar budget and those 1,400 or so full-time employees and get out into the field. YOU (FMCSA) are the enforcement mechanism right now. Do your primary job!
This FreightWaves article on the underground market for MC numbers highlights a problem that many people in trucking already know exists. Operating authorities are quietly changing hands. Entire “carrier packages” are being marketed online. Dispatch contacts, phone numbers, and email domains change overnight while the public record still shows the same motor carrier. When that happens, the identity tied to a USDOT or MC number no longer represents the operator actually moving freight.
The FMCSA bulletin is correct in principle. Operating authorities were never meant to be bought, sold, rented, or leased outside legitimate corporate transactions. They exist so regulators, brokers, shippers, and insurers can identify who is responsible for hauling freight and who is accountable for safety compliance.
A warning bulletin alone will not change behavior. Dale Prax says, “We have to start somewhere.” True, but issuing fatwas isn’t the right place. Boots on the ground is.
The real problem is enforcement visibility. With more than a million registered transportation entities and hundreds of thousands of active motor carriers, the system relies heavily on paperwork filings and self-policing. That creates a gap between the company listed in federal databases and the company actually operating trucks on the road.
Fraud actors know this. They do not need an authority to last for years. They only need a believable identity long enough to book loads, move freight, and disappear. By the time regulators discover the problem—often after a complaint, crash, or theft—the damage has already been done.
That is why the solution cannot remain purely administrative. Regulatory warnings must be backed by visible field enforcement.
Investigators showing up in person still matters. Office visits, compliance reviews, and targeted audits confirm something that databases cannot: who is actually running the company. When investigators knock on the door and ask to see the files, the dispatch office, the drivers, and the equipment, identity manipulation becomes much harder.
This is not about punishing legitimate carriers. Most truckers are trying to do the right thing. Strong enforcement protects them by removing the bad actors who distort the market, steal freight, and undermine trust in the industry.
Right now the system is reactive. The goal should be to verify identity and be proactive.
FMCSA is the legal authority. What the industry needs now is consistent, visible enforcement to back it up. Because when Dad says he might come back there, the kids behave very differently if they believe he actually will.