When everything is freight fraud, nothing is

Language shapes how we see problems and how seriously we take them. When a word or phrase gets used too often, too broadly, or too loosely, it begins to lose its meaning. Linguists call this semantic bleaching. It’s the phenomenon that turned the word “literally” into “kind of,” and made “love” something we say about a phone case or a cup of coffee. 

This is precisely what the freight industry has done to “freight fraud.” We’ve used the term so often, in so many contexts, that it no longer means anything. It is a catch-all for every type of criminal or deceptive activity. Everything from double-brokering and identity theft to fake pickups, forged certificates of insurance, and compromised email accounts.

What began as a real warning is now just another buzzword, repeated so often it’s lost all impact. Urgent, dangerous issues have been reduced to marketing campaigns. We’ve boiled deeply rooted problems into soundbites, hashtags, and oversimplified solutions.

The danger? When everything is “freight fraud,” nothing is. 

Without clear definitions, we chase our tails, mislabel threats, and solve nothing. Everyone talks about stolen freight, but the real danger keeps rolling—fraudulent carriers running for cheap rates, cutting corners, and never intending to play by the rules.

In the rush to spotlight stolen loads, we’ve overlooked the bigger problem: bad carriers hiding in plain sight. These aren’t one-time thieves, and in many cases, they’re not thieves at all. They’re repeat offenders who built fraud into their business model. They steal identities, ignore safety regulations, operate under misrepresented authority, and restart the same operation under a new name, again and again.

Freight fraud isn’t one problem with one fix. If it were, one of the dozens of vetting tools on the market would’ve already solved it. Freight fraud is a system built on distinct, traceable, and often preventable tactics. But we’ve buried those tactics in vetting tools with green checks and red Xs, mistaking box-checking for credibility.

If we want to fix this, we must start calling things by their names. This isn’t theory; these aren’t isolated events. These are the go-to methods fraudulent carriers use to stay in business, dodge accountability, and move freight they should never touch.

Using Facebook to Buy Authorities & Hide The Past

Fraudulent carriers buy existing USDOT numbers, often through Facebook groups or online forums, and change the contact information to assume the identity. They operate under that authority without completing proper registration, usually to hide violations and revoked authority from their other USDOTs. 

Yes, buying an entire business entity can be legal. But in these cases, the speed, anonymity, and lack of regulatory compliance suggest that most of these deals are not legitimate.

By taking over an older USDOT number, the purchasers appear more established than they are. That “age” helps them bypass basic vetting filters, like minimum time in operation.

This practice violates FMCSA rules. USDOT numbers are tied to a specific business name and tax ID. A change in ownership requires the new owner to apply for a new USDOT number, not simply swap identities.

Chameleon Carriers

These carriers cycle through USDOT numbers to dodge audits, erase their history, bypass vetting tools, and keep hauling freight. “Chameleon” and “ghost” carriers hide behind layers of LLCs and fake names, making it nearly impossible to trace who’s actually behind the wheel.

On load boards and vetting platforms, they look clean. They check all the boxes. Good authority age, a few violations; everything is in order. But behind the scenes, drivers are swapping placards and taping up a different USDOT from the folder in the cab. 

The illusion of legitimacy hides serious risks, and regulators, brokers, and shippers struggle to keep up.

Stolen Load Board Credentials

Fraudulent carriers steal login credentials from legitimate carriers, usually through phishing or weak passwords, and post fake capacity using their USDOT number. Brokers see a valid USDOT number and assign the load, not realizing they’re certainly not dealing with who they think they are. 

We want to automate everything, but automation makes this so much worse. If the carrier profile checks all the boxes, the system automatically tenders the load to the carrier. No questions asked. No human review required. No idea who is on the other end.

Compromised Email Accounts

Fraudulent carriers gain access to a legitimate carrier’s email account and assume the identity. Same domain, same signature, and same USDOT number. They communicate directly with brokers and shippers to book loads. Everything looks normal. But it’s not the real carrier behind the screen. 

Manipulated Documents 

Fraudulent carriers forge shipment documents to get paid. They alter piece counts, forge signatures, or create fake proof of delivery, often submitting the paperwork before anyone notices the load is missing or the order is incomplete.

Double-brokering

Double-brokering is the act of accepting a load and handing it off to another carrier, without the shipper’s or broker’s knowledge or consent. It introduces significant risk, hides the actual carrier, and complicates accountability when things go wrong.

Fraudulent carriers use double-brokering to mask ineligibility, move loads under someone else’s identity, or siphon profit from both ends.

Telling shippers and brokers to “vet your carriers carefully” is like handing out umbrellas in a hurricane. It sounds helpful, but it completely misses the real threat. 

That advice won’t stop a truck carrying a binder full of USDOT numbers, ready to slap on a new one at the next truck stop. Frankly, this kind of guidance is dangerous. 

Not all freight fraud is the same. A forged POD isn’t a phishing attack. A driver without a CDL isn’t a fake email. Changing an address on a Facebook-purchased USDOT number isn’t the same as an owner/operator moving homes. But today, we lump them all together under one vague label: “freight fraud.” 

Until we expose the specific criminal behaviors, we can’t address their root causes. Vague cries like, “PLEASE STOP FREIGHT FRAUD!” won’t push regulators to act. 

Let’s be clear: until the USDOT registration and update process is cleaned up, no one is truly being proactive. We’re all reacting to a system that has operated with minimal enforcement, allowing fraud to thrive for years. The flashy claims about “proactive approaches” and “next-gen vetting” mean very little when the foundation itself is flawed.

This article isn’t offering solutions. It’s a call for honesty. We need to stop hiding behind buzzwords and start naming the problems. This means genuine conversations, better enforcement, and education grounded in reality, not just compliance checklists.

All that said, there’s hope. The recent conversation between Timothy Dooner and Secretary Sean Duffy, and the executive order “Enforcing Commonsense Rules of the Road for America’s Truck Drivers,” signals that the right people are finally paying attention. If we stay focused on the real problems, not just the marketing language around them, we can start to turn the corner. 

Change won’t happen overnight, but it can happen.

It starts here, by calling suspicious behavior what it really is, by naming the tactics, not just the outcome. It means sharing what we know, educating others, and refusing to rely on vague advice or a single source of truth for vetting and compliance. It means helping each other keep the good carriers in and stop giving freight to the ones who never belonged on the road.